To develop an incentive model for GPs to test the performance and effectiveness of current incentives for GPs, so as to put forward suggestions to improve the mechanisms of employing and retaining GPs.

In August 2019, we recruited 204 GPs from 11 community health centers (CHCs) in Shanghai's Fengxian District using stratified random sampling to attend an online survey using a questionnaire named General Practitioners' Perception and Evaluation of Incentive Measures developed based on our previous research results and Herzberg's motivation-hygiene theory. Then from August to September 2019, we invited directors responsible for medical care or public health issues, and medical quality control department heads from the above-mentioned 11 CHCs to attend an online survey using a questionnaire named Workload for General Practitioners in Community Health Centers of Fengxian District developed by usbased on a literature review. Then under the guidance of Herzberg's motivation-hygiene theory, we constructed a structural equation to develop an incentive model for GPs within Fengxian District with representative incentive policies, systems and initiatives related to GPs selected from the survey results as latent independent variables to measure GPs' (responders') perception and assessment of incentives, and with willingness to work, service radius, and workload of GPs as dependent variables.

The average scores for the implementation of incentive measures, and its associated influence on GPs' work status assessed by the 204 GPs were (0.77±0.14) , and (0.73±0.19) , respectively. The assessment score for implementation of incentive measures for GPs differed significantly by personal health condition and administrative position in the respondents (P<0.05) . The assessment score for the influence of implementing incentive measures on GPs' work status differed significantly by personal health condition in the respondents (P<0.05) . Spearman correlation analysis showed that GPs' work status was associated with the implementation of 25 incentive measures (one incentive measure at the subdistrict level was not included for analysis) (P<0.05) . The top three most highly correlated incentive measures were performance distribution (r_s=0.652) , performance-based salary calculation (r_s=0.621) , and wages and benefits (r_s=0.614) . Partial correlation analysis indicated that, after controlling for variables such as the regional policy environment, the street and town government, and the work unit, the assessment score for implementation of either regional, or subdistrict or institutional incentive measures for GPs, was positively correlated with the assessment score for the influence of implementation of incentive measures for GPs on GPs' work status (r=0.381, 0.387, 0.528, P<0.001) . Theaverage assessment score for willingness to work by the respondents was (0.76±0.18) points. Theassessment scores of willingness to work by the respondents differed significantly by work unit (P<0.05) . Structural equation modeling revealed that the implementation of policy incentive measures influenced GPs' workload via GPs' willingness to work. Specifically, the implementation of policy incentive measures increased GPs' willingness to work (w1=0.43) , while GPs' willingness to work decreased with the increase of weighted workload (w2=-0.156) .

The GPs in Fengxian District showed higher level of willingness to work, namely, relatively high job stability, but they had not been incentivized by policy incentives to be competitive in obtaining improved performance, indicating that although policy incentives have produced partial effects on incentivizing GPs, the effects are still unsatisfactory. In the long run, it is necessary to consider whether there will be changes in GPs' retention status due to the lack of work initiative. For GPs, besides a guarantee of stable income, incentives to get more by doing more are also needed, which may be achieved by increasing the incentive authority and proportion of community health institutions when the total amount of incentives is limited.

本研究通过构建全科医生群体激励机制模型，来检验现行政策的激励措施及其实际成效，以提出改进意见与建议，完善全科医生用人、留人机制。

2019年8月，采用分层随机抽样方法从上海市奉贤区选取11家社区卫生服务中心的204例全科医生，邀请其填写"全科医生对激励措施的认知与评价现况调查问卷"；于2019年8—9月，邀请11家社区卫生服务中心的医疗业务分管主任/公共卫生业务分管主任、医疗质量控制科室负责人，填写"奉贤区社区卫生服务中心全科医生工作负荷调研表"。然后以赫兹伯格的双因素激励理论作为理论指导，以上海市奉贤区为研究范围，以区内全科医生为研究对象，将各级层面与激励相关的政策、制度和举措作为输入，将全科医生群体作为反应主体，提取有代表性的潜变量测量该群体的激励认知和激励评价，将全科医生群体的工作意愿、服务半径、工作量表现作为输出，建立全科医生群体激励机制模型。

204例全科医生对激励措施落实情况评价的平均得分为（0.77±0.14）分，认为激励措施落实情况对自身工作状态影响的平均得分为（0.73±0.19）分。不同健康状况、是否为行政岗位的全科医生对激励措施落实情况的评分比较，差异有统计学意义（P<0.05）；不同健康状况的全科医生对激励措施落实情况对自身工作状态影响的评分比较，差异有统计学意义（P<0.05）。Spearman秩相关分析结果显示，全科医生对25项激励措施（1项街镇层面的激励措施未分析）的评价和认为激励措施落实情况对自身工作状态的影响均具有相关性（P<0.05），其中相关性程度较高的前3条激励措施分别为绩效分配（r_s=0.65）、绩效工资计算方法（r_s=0.62）和工资福利（r_s=0.61）。偏相关分析结果显示，控制地区政策环境、所在街镇政府、所在工作单位变量后，全科医生对区域层面、街镇层面、机构层面激励措施落实情况的评价与全科医生认为此激励措施落实情况对自身工作状态的影响呈正相关（r=0.38、0.39、0.53，P<0.001）。204例全科医生的工作意愿得分为（0.76±0.18）分，不同机构全科医生工作意愿得分比较，差异有统计学意义（P<0.05）。结构方程模型结果显示，政策落实情况通过中介工作意愿影响最后的工作量表现，从落实情况到工作意愿为正向驱动（w1=0.43），而从工作意愿到加权工作量为负向驱动（w2=-0.156）。

奉贤区全科医生的工作意愿较好，也即稳定性较高，但政策的激励未能驱动有竞争态势的工作绩效表现。政策起到了保健作用，但激励作用失灵，长此以往，需考虑会否因为工作能动性的缺失，而造成留任意愿的变化；对全科医生群体而言，虽需要一定的保障，但更需多劳多得的激励，这一目标，在激励总量有限的情况下，可通过增加社区卫生服务机构的激励权限和比重来实现。